Hello Everyone. New posts from me at DamianMichael.com. Please move there to keep up-to-date with my newest postings and books.
Thank you.
The Argument for Negative-Theism
The Three Principles of Great Leadership
Moving to ‘Damian Michael’ Website
Hello Everyone,
Given that I have started publishing a number of books and articles under my name, and given that I have more books coming, I have decided that it is best if I consolidate all my work under one website. As such, all the content on this site has now been exported to ‘damianmichael.com’.
Please note that all my regular blogging and writing will be done at www.damianmichael.com.
Please join me there. Thank you.
Damian Michael
Women Skip Work…and Teach Us How Important Men Are
This post was originally published at ‘Return of Kings’ and can be found HERE.
On the 8th of March, 2017, a large number of Western women played hookie; indeed, in connection with the protests that were taken by women against President Donald Trump in January of 2017, the organizers of those protests called on women to skip work on the 8th of March in order to show their strength and influence in society. And so, the 8th of March came, and passed, and do you know what happened? Nothing. Or at least nothing significant. Indeed, Donald Trump stayed President, businesses kept running, and the United States still exists. Now, it is granted that, in all likelihood, relatively few women participated in this joke-of-a-protest, because a decent number of women are—thank God!—still intelligent enough to see through such a farce. Nevertheless, this whole event is still instructive as it offers us a chance to reflect on what would really happen if such an event were taken seriously.
Imagine, for a moment, that all women in the Western world really did take a day off work; all they did was stay home and watch their children (if they had any). What would happen? Oh, there would be major disruptions no doubt. Young children might lack some of their teachers. Doctors might have to take blood for the absent nurses and jerry-rig a few operations. The one lone male in human resources might get overwhelmed. And a number of men might have to get called in for some overtime. Ironically, a lot of women might also find out that they are happier in the home rather than being a corporate drone. But nevertheless, on this imaginary ‘women-less’ day, civilization would continue moving forward; a few people would seriously suffer here and there, but society as we know it would continue chugging along. Food would still be in the fridge. Traffic and deliveries would continue. And life would go on. In fact, if we knew in advance when this “Day Without Women” would be, then men could largely mitigate the effects that this would have on society. So there would be pain, but this pain would be temporary, and soon things would be back to normal.
But now imagine, just for a second, that society experienced a “Day Without Men”. Indeed, imagine that all the men in the Western world, all at the same time, truly decided not to work for a day no matter what happened. All men stopped working for one full day. And imagine that this was known in advance. You know what would happen? Well, think of what has happened in the past when the police—a largely male profession, especially on the front lines—went on strike. There would be riots, civil unrest, looting, and a serious increase in criminality. People would die in fires and car accidents due to the lack of firefighters; in fact, fires that might normally get contained would spread and cause much more devastation than normal. Deliveries of food and essentially services would cease to a trickle. Power outages and other major mechanical and electrical concerns would have almost no one to address them. Terrorist attacks would likely sky-rocket given the lack of any serious armed response to the terrorist threat. And worst of all, the Western world would likely be invaded and destroyed. Seriously! If the enemies of the West knew that men—who comprise the bulk of all fighting forces for Western militaries—were taking the day off, would they not seize the opportunity to strike. After all, who would be manning the guns on the gates of a military camp or on an aircraft carrier? Who would be piloting the fighters to repel an enemy air attack? Who would be guarding our embassies and responding to any threats? Who would be manning the command posts to launch our nuclear arsenal in case of an attack? Would not, for example, North Korea sweep through the South if it knew for sure that all the men in South Korea and Japan had taken the day off? Of course it would! Now, for sure, there are women in the military, and many of them would no doubt do a fine job trying to compensate for the lack of men, but a female soldier in a support trade is no front-line marine, and in nearly all military contests, a group of well-trained men will defeat a group of well-trained women any day of the week. So the fact remains that without men for a day, the West would be vulnerable in a potentially civilization-ending way.
So, what do these little thought-experiments show us? Well, they give us a glimpse of reality; a reality that cannot be concealed no matter how much modern feminists wish to hide it. And that reality is the following: in terms of their immediate importance, women are not indispensable to society, for everything that a woman does outside the home, a man can do as well. A man can be a nurse; he can be a teacher; he can be a day-care worker. On the other hand, men—given their greater physical strength and aggression—fill most of the roles that are needed to maintain the stability and protection of society on a day-to-day basis, and so men are indispensable to society in an immediate sense. Indeed, society could relatively easily survive a day without women, but it might not survive a day without men, for whereas the former situation would be like getting kicked in the balls, the latter would be like getting shot—you might survive, but you might also die.
Now, does all this mean that women are not indispensable to Western civilization? Of course not. Women, being supremely well-suited to the birthing and nurturing of children, are indispensable to civilization, for children—meaning future citizens—are the fuel that keeps a civilization running. And since, without women, there would be no children, and hence no future civilization, then obviously, women are critical to the maintenance and survival of a civilization. However, unlike men, and unlike the message that the organizers of the “Day Without Women” want to convey, women are indispensable in the long-term sense, whereas men are indispensable in the short-term. And so this is the key point: men and women are both indispensable to society, but they are indispensable in complementary ways, not in the same way. So feminists need to stop trying to pretend that women are men or that women are vital to a civilization in the same way that men are. They are not, and that is just reality. And the sooner that we accept that reality, the better it will be for all of us.
An Article on ROK
You may have already seen this article, but here is one of my articles on ROK:
Intelligent Design Needs a Re-Branding
The Reconquista Initiative
Presents
Intelligent Design Needs a Re-Branding
In this age of consumerism, everyone understands the importance of positive branding; indeed, companies and individuals alike readily comprehend that if your “brand” has negative connotations attached to it, then there are a great many people that will pre-judge you on that basis alone rather than taking the time to survey your ideas in the detail that they deserve. And though such a “pre-judging” may not be fair, it is a reality, and there is no escaping that reality. So, in light of this fact, I thus contend that given the branding difficulties that now surround it, it may be time for the Intelligent Design (ID) movement to consider re-branding itself with a new and improved label. Indeed, perhaps it is time for the ID movement to change its main moniker to something like the ‘Science of Intelligent Agent Detection’ or ‘Agent Detection Science’. And the reasons for why this proposed change would be beneficial to the ID community are as follows:
- First, in making this change, there is the obvious benefit that some small part of the negative branding and prejudice associated with ID would be removed, and thus ID could gain some additional supporters merely from making this minor change to its name.
- Second, the label ‘Agent Detection Science’ (or the ‘Science of Intelligent Agent Detection’) sounds more professional, academic, and intellectually rigorous than the term ‘Intelligent Design’ does, just as the term ‘Forensic Science’ sounds more professional, academic, and intellectually rigorous than the term ‘Scenes of Crime Investigation’ does. And so, such a labeling change will have a positive persuasive effect at an almost sub-conscious level, which, in turn, should give ID a greater chance at a fair hearing amongst people who would otherwise disregard it without a second thought.
- Third, by labeling itself as ‘Agent Detection Science’, the ID movement actually links itself much more closely to other ID-type fields like forensics, archaeology, and SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence). Indeed, given that all these other fields are in the business of detecting the hallmarks of agent causation rather than natural causation, and furthermore, since all these fields are, quite literally, agent detection sciences, then by directly labeling itself as an ‘Agent Detection Science’, the ID movement would gain greater credibility through its clear connection to these other already-credible fields; furthermore, such a labeling “connection” would also automatically make it the case that any objections brought against the methodology and “scientific status” of ID would simultaneously be objections against the methodology and “scientific status” of such disciplines as forensics, archaeology, SETI, and so on. And since many individuals would be loath to deny the legitimacy of the methodology and scientific status of these latter fields, then such individuals might at least hesitate in their objections to ID given its similarity to these other fields.
- Fourth, the label ‘Agent Detection Science’ is more precise than the ID moniker, for ID, as well as all the other ID-type sciences already mentioned (like archaeology) are in the very business of using certain methodologies to detect the presence and activity of agents rather than of natural causes, and so, by changing the name from ID to something like ‘Agent Detection Science’, the ID movement would, in its very title, be clearly stating what it actually strives to do. And since what ID strives to do is in no way shocking when you consider that SETI, archaeology, forensics, and other fields strive to do the exact same thing, then in providing this clarity in its very label the ID movement would be clear that it is little different than these other sciences are.
- Fifth, ‘Agent Detection Science’ has the term science in its very name, which helps to immediately and directly assert that ID is a science, just like forensics and archaeology are considered to be, and so its status as a claimed science is put right into the open for all to see (and please note that if you truly deny that ID is a science, then it would be easy enough to change the name to ‘Agent Detection Methodology’ or ‘Agent Detection Theory’ or even ‘Agent Detection Analysis’).
And so, the long and short of it is this: there are a number of excellent reasons why the ID movement should consider re-branding itself; doing so would help to take ID to the next level of its development while simultaneously dropping some of the negative baggage that is, at the present time, directly attached to the ID label. And such positive changes would be highly beneficial to the ID movement as a whole.
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Anno Domini 2017 03 07
Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam
Destroying the Use of Progressive Statistics
The Reconquista Initiative
Presents…
Destroying the Use of Progressive Statistics
While sitting on the toilet one day, I had an epiphany: all the statistics that modern feminists, SJWs, progressives, and other leftists use as rhetorical tools against their opponents are utterly unreliable. Now, I do not mean that they are unreliable in the rather obvious sense that they have been refuted by countless other experts, but rather, I mean that, in a very ironic twist, the reliability of the statistics that progressive leftists love to use are actually undermined by their very own ideas and principles!
So, what do I mean by this? Well, consider that today, the progressive left tells us that gender is a social construct; as such, a man can thus allegedly become a woman, and a woman can allegedly become a man, all on the basis of how these men and women feel inside. In fact, the left tells us that there are a great number of different “genders”. For example, there are gender “fluids”, where a woman might decide to be a man one day and a woman the next, all depending on how her confused little heart feels once the sun rises.
So what is clear from all this is that the natural and commonsensical delineation between men and women is something which does not exist for the progressive left given their embrace of multiple gender categories. At the same time, it is evident that the left also endorses the idea that people are able to switch their gender categories on a relatively regular basis—if they desire to do so—all depending on how they subjectively feel rather than on any objective criteria. Furthermore, anyone who fails to take into account a person’s self-identity, and anyone who purposely or knowingly misidentifies the self-selected gender identity of a person is considered a bigot by the left.
Now, the interesting aspect of this whole situation arises when it is realized that in addition to all of the above, the progressive left also loves to use questionable statistics as a means of pushing their agenda. I mean, how often do we hear that women make less than men for the same work. And how often do we here that a “rape culture” exists, with men apparently sexually assaulted countless women on college campuses. Indeed, these kinds of statistics are used all the time by progressive feminists and others to bolster their narrative. And while many of these leftist statistics have been debunked using other, more accurate statistics, my point is that no other data or arguments are needed to undermine these leftist stats. Rather, all that is needed is to parrot the left’s talking points back to them. And when this is done, their appeal to statistics and data implodes.
Consider the following: if gender is fluid and changeable on a whim, and if there are dozens upon dozens of genders, and if society must treat these gender self-selections as real, then any statistics about the inequality in pay between men and women, or the sexual assault rates between men and women, or any other such statistics, are, by definition, unreliable. For if men can become women merely by feeling it, and if women can become men in the same way, then how do we actually know, for example, what the so-called pay-gap is between men and women? After all, at the time that the statistics were taken, did anyone ask the people what gender they self-identified with? Were enough gender options provided? Did anyone conduct a further study to see if the respondent’s self-identity has changed since the initial report was done? And the same questions could be asked about the alleged “rape culture” stats. At the time that the sexual assaults occurred, did anyone ask the aggressors what their gender identity was at the exact time of the alleged attack? Perhaps certain male aggressors identified as “womyn” at the time. Or perhaps they identified as gender fluid. In that case, perhaps we have an alleged lesbian “rape culture” on our hands rather than a supposed male one.
Furthermore, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the statistics that were previously gathered were accurate at that time, there is nothing to say that they are accurate now. Gender is fluid after all. People may have changed their gender identity since the last time the statistics were taken. Perhaps now we have a “rape culture” were self-identified “women” are regularly assaulting men. Hell, even if the statistics were re-taken today, by tomorrow, we could, on leftist principles, reasonably doubt their accuracy and reliability, for again, if gender is fluid, then we have no idea whether the statistics are still accurate or not.
So, by their very own lights, leftists and progressives provide us with the means to undermine their own narrative. They tell us gender is fluid, and we say “OK, but that means that all the stats that you use to talk about gender discrimination and alleged misogyny are unreliable and uncertain, for how do you know what gender these people were when the stats were taken and how do you know that the stats are still accurate now.” And if the progressive left then screams that we are being unfair, or “unscientific”, then we can just call them bigots. After all, they are using statistics which almost certainly did not let people choose one of the five dozen or so different genders out there at the time that the stats were taken; and that means that those statistics were created in a bigoted “cis-normative” bubble!
So the SJW progressives are stuck in a bit of a dilemma: either they admit that the statistics that they love to use are ultimately unreliable given their own principles and ideas, or else they renege on those principles and ideas by continuing to use the statistics in question, and thus they become the very cis-normative bigots that they allegedly despise. Essentially, the progressive is between a rock and a hard place. However, for those of us who loath SJW ideas, we should exploit this dilemma at every opportunity. Indeed, when an SJW gives you his favorite stat about sexism, just lay into him as a bigot for using such cis-normative statistics, and then tell him that his statistics are unreliable anyway.
Now, will this strategy change the minds of anyone on the progressive left? Of course not! After all, embracing absurdity and double-standards is an essential part of being an SJW, so absorbing one more absurdity will have no effect on them; at the same time, the progressive embrace of these absurd ideas is mainly about gaining more power over their ideological opponents rather than about truth, and so as long as they are gaining power in some way, the progressives do not care that their position is logically absurd. However, what pointing out these absurdities on the left does is move more normal people away from them. And the less that normal people support them, the fewer allies that they have. And that is the goal of pointing out leftist absurdities for all to see.
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Anno Domini 2017 03 04
Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam
Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit: Part 3 – Agnosticism as Knowledge
The Reconquista Initiative
Presents…
Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit: Part 3 – Agnosticism as Knowledge
In both Part 1 and Part 2 of the previous essay “Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit”, it was argued that so-called lack-of-belief atheism (or negative-atheism) and agnosticism are essentially synonymous; indeed, negative lack-of-belief atheism is really just agnosticism by another name (or is better described as something like ‘ignotheism’ for those who are genuinely ignorant of the question of God’s existence). Now, in response to the claim that lack-of-belief atheism and agnosticism are the same position, some atheists assert that the difference between atheism and agnosticism is that atheism allegedly deals with belief claims whereas agnosticism deals strictly with knowledge claims, thereby implying that a person could be an atheist and an agnostic at the same time without a contradiction necessarily arising. Such critics argue that rather than seeing agnosticism as resting at the mid-point between atheism and theism on the spectrum of theistic belief, agnosticism is actually best understood as resting in a separate category altogether, thus meaning that it does not overlap with atheism. Consider, for example, what Austin Cline, an ‘Agnosticism & Atheism Expert’ at the popular website ‘atheism.about.com’, says in his 7th of September 2016 online article “Atheist vs. Agnostic – What’s the Difference?”, which was accessed on the 28th of February 2017; Cline says the following:
[QUOTE] An atheist is anyone who doesn’t happen to believe in any gods, no matter what their reasons or how they approach the question of whether any gods exist. This is a very simple concept, but it’s also widely misunderstood. For that reason, there are a variety of ways to state this. Atheism is: the lack of belief in gods, the absence of belief in gods, disbelief in gods, not believing in gods.
…
An agnostic is anyone who doesn’t claim to know for that any gods exist or not, no matter what their reasons or how they approach the question of whether any gods exist.
There’s a simple test to tell if one is an agnostic or not. Do you think you know for sure if any gods exist? If so, then you’re not an agnostic. Do you think you know for sure that gods do not or even cannot exist? If so, then you’re not an agnostic. Everyone who can’t answer “yes” to one of those questions is a person who may or may not believe in one or more gods, but since they don’t also claim to know for sure they are agnostic — an agnostic theist or an agnostic atheist.
An agnostic atheist has two qualities: they don’t happen to believe in any gods and they don’t claim to know [f]or sure that no gods can or do exist.
…
An agnostic theist has two qualities: they believe in the existence of at least one god and they don’t claim to know for sure that this god or gods definitely exist.
…
…many people have the mistaken impression that agnosticism and atheism are mutually exclusive. But why? There’s nothing about “I don’t know” which excludes “I don’t believe.” On the contrary, not only are they compatible but they frequently appear together because not knowing is frequently a reason for not believing. It’s often a very good idea to not accept some proposition is true unless you have enough evidence that would qualify as knowledge. [UNQUOTE, http://atheism.about.com/od/aboutagnosticism/a/Atheist-vs-Agnostic-Difference.htm%5D
And note that this attempt to differentiate atheism from agnosticism in the above manner stems from the fact that the word ‘gnostic’ pertains to the issue of knowledge and of having knowledge, and so an ‘a-gnostic’ is thus be someone who lacks knowledge about something.
Now, as Cline notes, what the above atheistic assertion claims is that when it comes to categorizing the various unbelieving positions that a person could hold, a person could thus join atheism and agnosticism together without contradiction or redundancy. Indeed, a person could thus be an agnostic-atheist; and this would mean—as per Cline—that the person does not happen to believe in any God or gods (hereafter just God) and he does not claim to know that there is no God. But here we run into a problem. Namely, if atheism—as Cline defines it—is just a lack of belief in God, then the term ‘agnostic-atheist’ actually is redundant and trivial. Why? Because to claim to know something necessarily includes having a positive belief about it. Indeed, knowledge is most often defined as a ‘justified true belief’ or a ‘warranted true belief’. Furthermore, even a more commonsensical and common understanding of what knowledge is, namely, a very well-evidenced belief, still includes a positive belief within it. After all, when a criminal is found guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that the criminal is guilty, but we consider such a belief to be knowledge because it is a very well supported belief; this is why, in common parlance, we rightly say that we know that the criminal is guilty of the crime in question. So the point is that knowledge necessarily includes a component of belief within it. But what this now means is the following: if a person lacks a belief in some proposition, then they necessarily do not know it. Consequently, if atheism is defined as just a lack-of-belief in the existence of God, then there is no point in claiming to also not know that God does not exist, because such a lack of knowledge is necessarily included and implied in the initial lack-of-belief; to lack a belief in something is to lack knowledge of it as well, so there is no reason to say the same thing twice. Indeed, the term ‘agnostic-atheist’ essentially means that you are saying “I have absolutely no positive belief of any type concerning the existence or non-existence of God (lack-of-belief atheism), and I have no justified true belief (knowledge) concerning the existence or non-existence of God either.” Well, obviously, for if you take the former position, then the latter one is automatically included in it, and thus there is no point in being redundant by calling one’s self an agnostic-atheist. And so, the whole push to somehow make lack-of-belief atheism and agnosticism distinct, and thus combinable, becomes yet another shell-game, for it is just a way of saying the same thing twice. Indeed, if atheism is defined as just a lack-of-belief, then agnostic-atheism is a redundant and unnecessary term.
Now, to see this whole problem from a different angle, consider that if the term ‘agnostic-atheist’ were useful or necessary, then the term ‘gnostic-atheist’ should also be useful and necessary. But far from being useful, the term ‘gnostic-atheist’ is incoherent. Indeed, for if atheism is defined as just a lack-of-belief, then no atheist could be a gnostic-atheist. Why? Because the term ‘gnostic’ means to have knowledge, which—as shown above—means to have a positive justified true belief about something (or a warranted true belief), not a lack of belief. But if atheism is just a lack-of-belief, then ‘gnostic-atheism’ is a contradiction, for it is claiming that someone both lacks a belief concerning God’s existence (atheism) while at the same time actually having a positive justified true belief (knowledge: ie – gnosticism) that God does not exist. But no one can lack a belief concerning the question of God’s existence while at the same time positively believing that God does not exist, for to have a positive belief that God does not exist means that you do not lack a belief concerning the question of God’s existence, but rather you positively deny that God exists. And so the term ‘gnostic-atheist’ essentially means that you are saying “I have absolutely no positive belief of any type concerning the existence or non-existence of God (lack-of-belief atheism), and yet I have a justified true positive belief (knowledge) that God does not exist.” Now, obviously, such a position is contradictory, and so it is indeed impossible for someone to be a gnostic-atheist so long as atheism is taken to be a mere lack of belief.
Therefore, when atheism is defined as a lack-of-belief, adding an agnostic or gnostic prefix to the term ‘atheism’ is either redundant or contradictory. Furthermore, note as well that even if the term ‘agnostic-atheism’ was not redundant, it is still just agnosticism by another name. Indeed, for given that the agnostic-atheist allegedly lacks a belief in God and also does not claim to know whether or not God exists, then such a person just is a person who neither believes nor disbelieves in the existence of God, and such a definition has traditionally been the definition of what an agnostic is, as numerous quotes in the previous essays in this series show. So even the attempt to combine atheism and agnosticism into the term ‘agnostic-atheist’ does nothing to remove the fact that such a position is merely another name for what many people—and many legitimate sources—already define as straight agnosticism.
And so, the long and short of it is this: if atheism is defined as a lack-of-belief, then the attempt to make agnosticism into something that is distinct from atheism and that can be tacked on to the term ‘atheism’ simply does not work. After all, the term ‘agnosticism-atheism’ is redundant and is still synonymous with just plain old agnosticism, while the term ‘gnostic-atheism’ is contradictory. Thus, this particular attempt to escape the claim that lack-of-belief atheism is essentially just another term for agnosticism fails. Now, if atheism was defined in a positive manner—namely as a positive belief that God does not exist—then separating atheism into gnostic-atheism and agnostic-atheism would work, but whether or not this strategy would allow atheism to avoid the charge of just being another term for agnosticism is a topic for another essay.
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Anno Domini 2017 03 03
Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam
Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit: Part 2 – Martin’s Example
The Reconquista Initiative
Presents…
Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit: Part 2 – Martin’s Example
In the previous essay “Atheism, Agnosticism, and Bullshit”, it was argued that lack-of-belief atheism—also called negative-atheism—is really just agnosticism in disguise. Indeed, the two terms are essentially synonymous. And in that previous essay, it was specifically mentioned that atheist Michael Martin, via his own writings and through his own words, provides the very means to demonstrate why negative-atheism and agnosticism are essentially the same. And so this essay will examine Martin’s writing to see why this is the case.
Now, in his “General Introduction” to the 2006 Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Martin says the following about atheism:
[QUOTE] If you look up “atheism” in a dictionary, you will find it defined as the belief that there is no God. Certainly, many people understand “atheism” in this way. Yet this is not what the term means if one considers it from the point of view of its Greek roots. In Greek “a” means “without” or “not”, and “theos” means “god.” From this standpoint, an atheist is someone without belief in God; he or she need not be someone who believes that God does not exist. Still, there is a popular dictionary meaning of “atheism” according to which an atheist is not simply one who holds no belief in the existence of a God or gods but is one who believes that there is no God or gods. This dictionary use of the term should not be overlooked. To avoid confusion, let us call it positive atheism and let us call the type of atheism derived from the original Greek roots negative atheism. [UNQUOTE]
And now Martin, after agreeing that a negative-atheist is someone without a belief in God or gods (hereafter just God), then continues in the following vein concerning agnosticism:
[QUOTE] Agnosticism, the position of neither believing nor disbelieving that God exists, is often contrasted with atheism. However, this common opposition of agnosticism to atheism is misleading. Agnosticism and positive atheism are indeed incompatible: if atheism is true, agnosticism is false and conversely. But agnosticism is compatible with negative atheism in that agnosticism entails negative atheism. Since agnostics do not believe in God, they are by definition negative atheists. This is not to say that negative atheism entails agnosticism. A negative atheist might disbelieve in God but need not. [UNQUOTE, bold emphasis added]
So it is clear that Martin perceives the conflation between negative-atheism and agnosticism. And although Martin says that while agnosticism entails negative-atheism, negative-atheism does not necessarily entail agnosticism, it is hard to see why this is so. Martin does say that a negative-atheist might disbelieve in God but need not do so. Now it is hard to know exactly what Martin means, but if he means that a negative-atheist might be a person who is genuinely ignorant of the whole issue of God and thus does not actually disbelieve in the existence of God because the person does not even know what God is, then such a view is fair enough, and perhaps the term negative-atheist can be used in this way. However, in reality, not only would such a genuinely ignorant person be better labelled with the less-prejudicial and more accurate term of ‘ignotheist’ (or even ignorant-agnostic (both of which mean someone who is genuinely ignorant of theism and who thus, by necessity, neither believes nor disbelieves in the existence of God), but, additionally, if the term negative-atheist (or lack-of-belief atheist) merely describes a person who is genuinely ignorant of the concept of God, then it is a term which is completely inapplicable to any self-described and self-aware adult atheist. And yet, it is precisely such people that use the term negative-atheist to describe themselves. So if the term ‘negative-atheist’ is meant to describe people who are truly ignorant of even the idea of God, then not only is it a poor term for this task, but it has almost no practical application given that nearly all the individuals who use the term as a self-label are well-aware of the question of God and his existence. Furthermore, Martin’s own words will later show that negative-atheism, as he defines it, cannot apply to individuals who are genuinely ignorant of God. And so, even if its potential applicability as a descriptive label of people who are genuinely ignorant of God that is the only reason why negative-atheism does not entail agnosticism, then, with the removal of that reason—a reason that can indeed be removed for all practical purposes given the way that the term negative-atheism is actually applied in our modern culture—it is thus the case that negative-atheism does indeed entail agnosticism and there is not real difference between the two. And this point can be shown in even more detail when we consider how Martin, once again in the same work, defines the two types of agnosticism. Here is Martin’s definition:
[QUOTE] Here I will explore what is at issue between positive atheism and agnosticism. An agnostic, one might suppose, is skeptical that good grounds exist [to disbelieve that God exists], whereas an atheist is not. However, this is not the only way the difference between these positions can be construed. An agnostic might think that there are good grounds for disbelieving that God exists but also believe that there are equally good grounds for believing that God exists. These opposing reasons would offset one another, leaving no overall positive reason to believe or disbelieve.
Let us call the view that there are no good reasons for believing that God exists and none for believing that God does not exist skeptical agnosticism and the view that there are equally good reasons for believing both theism and atheism that offset one another cancellation agnosticism.
Arguments that are intended to establish both negative and positive atheism refute both skeptical and cancellation agnosticism. Showing that negative atheism is justified undermines cancellation agnosticism, for it assumes that both atheism and theism have good grounds that cancel each other out, and negative atheism entails that there are no good grounds for theistic belief. Moreover, arguments showing that there are good grounds for the nonexistence of God undermine skeptical agnosticism since skeptical agnosticism assumes that there are no good grounds for either atheism or theism. [UNQUOTE, bold emphasis added]
Now the problem that arises from Martin’s aforementioned connection between agnosticism and negative-atheism is that Martin’s own reasoning essentially destroys any justification for the existence of what Martin calls negative-atheism.
Consider that Martin says that cancellation-agnosticism—which Martin defines as being the position that while there are good grounds for theistic belief, these grounds are cancelled out by equally good grounds for atheistic belief—can be undermined by negative-atheism, because negative-atheism allegedly shows that there are no good grounds for theistic belief. And yet the problem is that if negative lack-of-belief atheism undermines cancellation-agnosticism by removing the cancellation-agnostic’s good grounds for theistic belief, then the cancellation-agnostic (as per Martin’s definition) still has good grounds for atheistic belief, which means that the cancellation-agnostic becomes a positive-atheist rather than a negative one, for the atheist now has unimpeded good grounds for the positive belief that God does not exist. But if the cancellation-agnostic does not have good enough grounds to become a positive-atheist after hearing the negative-atheist’s arguments, then he is, also as per Martin’s definition, simply a skeptical-agnostic rather than a negative-atheist, for remember that Martin defines a skeptical-agnostic as a person who sees no good reasons for believing that God exists and no good reasons for believing that God does not exist.
But now the question becomes: where does negative lack-of-belief atheism fit in to all this? After all, as per Martin’s own definitions, it seems that negative-atheism, when pushed, simply collapses into either positive-atheism or skeptical-agnosticism, and thus there is no room to legitimately fit negative-atheism into the spectrum from positive-atheism to agnosticism. For again, if negative-atheism causes the cancellation-agnostic to lose his good grounds for believing in theism but to simultaneously maintain his good grounds for believing in atheism, then the cancellation-agnostic becomes a positive-atheist, even if only to a slight degree. And yet if negative-atheism causes the cancellation-agnostic to lose his good grounds for believing in theism, and if the cancellation-agnostic then also loses his good grounds for believing in atheism, or if his grounds for believing in atheism are not sufficient to justify belief in positive-atheism, then the cancellation-agnostic simply becomes a skeptical-agnostic, not a negative-atheist. In essence, there is nowhere for the negative lack-of-belief atheist to fit, for either 1) an unbeliever has good enough grounds for atheism to believe that atheism is, to a greater or lesser degree, more probable than not, and thus the unbeliever becomes a positive-atheist of a certain strength, or else 2) the unbeliever does not have good enough grounds to believe that atheism is true, and then the unbeliever becomes a skeptical-agnostic; what there is no room for is a negative-atheist who just lacks a belief in God, for such a lack-of-belief atheist just is a skeptical-agnostic. And so, in light of the above, and as per Martin’s own definitions, and at least if we are speaking of individuals who are aware of the idea of God, then it seems that there cannot be any coherent place for negative-atheism to fit along the spectrum of theistic belief unless it serves as nothing else than a different label for skeptical-agnosticism.
Additionally, if the negative-atheist tries to squeeze himself in somewhere between positive-atheism and skeptical-agnosticism by claiming that there are good enough grounds for atheism to not label oneself as an agnostic, and yet those grounds are not quite good enough to have a positive-belief in atheism, then note that such a claim is incoherent. After all, a positive-atheist’s degree of belief in the proposition that God does not exist can be quite weak, but it is nevertheless still a positive belief in a positive claim. Indeed, it is the positive belief that there are good enough grounds to lean away from agnosticism towards a type of tenuous atheism, but not good enough grounds for full-blown beyond-a-reasonable-doubt atheism. But again, a tenuous form of positive atheism is nevertheless still a positive claim that would need to be defended, and it is by no means a mere absence of belief. Thus, such a tenuous atheism cannot coherently be categorized as a lack-of-belief, for it is nothing of the kind. Rather, it is, as stated, a positive belief, albeit a very weak and hesitant one. And so again, such a tenuous and probabilistic atheism simply cannot be accurately described as lack-of-belief atheism, for it is actually a positive belief, and thus it falls under positive-atheism, even though the tenuous level of positive-atheism that the person possessed in this particular case would need to be made clear.
Negative-Atheism as No Good Grounds
Now, if the unbeliever tries to claim—as Michael Martin did in one of the quotations above—that negative-atheism is a position which entails that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, and thus that a negative-atheist should be understood as a person who holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, then a number of points can be noted in response to this idea.
First, notice that if a negative-atheist is a person who holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief then, by definition, such a person cannot be genuinely ignorant of the idea of God; after all, a person know believes that there are no good grounds for theistic belief needs to know what theism is and needs to know, and reject, the grounds for theism. And so if negative-atheism describes a person who claims that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, then it cannot be used as a label for a person who is genuinely ignorant of theism, which was—as we saw earlier—a potentially legitimate use of the term ‘negative-atheist’. But such use of the term is no longer possible if negative-atheism entails that there are no good grounds for theistic belief.
Second, merely claiming that there are no good grounds for theistic belief does not necessarily indicate what an individual’s position is on the spectrum of theistic belief. For example, a fideistic-theist could agree that there are no good grounds for theistic belief and yet believe in theism regardless; consequently, believing that there are no good grounds for theistic belief would not necessarily mean that a person is a negative-atheist, nor that a person would wish to be labeled as such. In fact, as I explain in my book Turning the Tables on Atheism, a person could hold that there are no good grounds for theistic belief and yet nevertheless still prefer to be labeled as a negative-theist rather than a negative-atheist. Furthermore, note that the skeptical-agnostic also holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, and yet the skeptical-agnostic is an agnostic, not a negative-atheist. So simply holding to the idea that there are no good grounds for theistic belief is insufficient grounds to label someone as a negative-atheist. And, as illustrated above, such a label might actually be quite inaccurate in certain cases.
Now, the third response to the idea that negative-atheism should be understood as the position that there are no good grounds from theistic belief is the more substantive one, for this response argues that defining negative-atheism in the above fashion still does nothing to alleviate the problem that negative-atheism is simply a different term for skeptical-agnosticism. After all, as mentioned, the skeptical-agnostic also holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, and so negative-atheism appears to be nothing more than skeptical-agnosticism in disguise. And again, if the negative-atheist not only claims that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, but he also claims that there are no good grounds for positive atheistic belief (and a negative-atheist could claim this), and thus the negative-atheist claims to neither believe nor disbelieve in God, then that is the very definition of a skeptical-agnostic! And so again, negative-atheism is still nothing more than skeptical-agnosticism. And yet if the negative-atheist thinks that there are no good grounds for theistic belief but there are good grounds for atheistic belief, at least to some degree or another, then, by the definitions provided above, such an individual is a positive-atheist, not a negative one. So again, there is no room for the idea of negative-atheism, for either an individual is a skeptical-agnostic, or he is a positive-atheist.
However, perhaps it could be argued that a negative-atheist is someone who holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, and yet, at the same time, the person is completely ignorant of the grounds for atheistic belief. Now, while the existence of a person who holds such a position is theoretically possible, in practice, such a potential reality is essentially irrelevant given the fact that anyone who examines the grounds for theism, and finds them wanting, will almost certainly encounter and/or contemplate some arguments and reasons for atheism while doing so; this means that, in practice, a person who holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief will never really be completely ignorant of some of the grounds for atheistic belief. In fact, since a person who contemplates the grounds for belief in God’s existence would, at the same time, almost certainly come to consider at least some of the grounds for belief that God might not exist, this then means that after doing so, the person would necessarily adopt some kind of position about that latter claim; and so this means that after contemplating some of the grounds for atheism, the person would either 1) accept the grounds for atheistic belief and come to believe that God does not exist (positive-atheism), or 2) take the opposite view (theism), or 3) reject the grounds for atheism and adopt a position of uncertainty about God’s existence (agnosticism). However, this returns us to our earlier point, which is that a person who rejects the grounds for theism but accepts those for atheism is a positive-atheist, whereas a person who rejects both the grounds for theism and for atheism is a skeptical-agnostic; but again, there is no room for negative-atheism between the two unless negative-atheism is merely a synonym for skeptical-agnosticism!
Furthermore, note that even if, in the purely theoretical sense, it was possible for a person to hold that there were no good grounds for theistic belief while being genuinely ignorant of any of the grounds for atheism, this would still do nothing to negate the fact that negative-atheism is really just a form of agnosticism in disguise, and that it is best described as a type of agnosticism. After all, a person who holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, but is ignorant of the grounds for atheistic belief, would still be a person who neither believed nor disbelieved in the existence of God; but such a position is the very definition of agnosticism, as Martin and others—as well as many dictionaries—have pointed out (and see their quotes in both this essay and others for substantiation of this claim). At the very least, it is as much of an agnostic position as it is one of negative-atheism, and so, once again, a conflation between negative-atheism and agnosticism occurs. Additionally, it is highly questionable whether it is fair or even accurate to label a person who is ignorant of atheism as a negative-atheist; rather, and as mentioned earlier, a term like ‘ignorant-agnostic’ seems like a much more judicious, fair, and appropriate label for such a person. And so, even if there could be a person who is wholly ignorant of atheism while still holding that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, this would not negate the fact that negative-atheism would not be an appropriate label for such a person, and that such a person’s actual position would be a form of agnosticism, thus once again showing the tangled web that negative-atheism has with agnosticism.
Finally, note as well that if a person held that there are no good grounds for theistic belief, and yet that person was merely doubtful or skeptical of the “goodness” of the grounds for atheistic belief—meaning that he was doubtful of just how good the arguments for atheism were, but not that they were good arguments in general—then, once again, such a person is best thought of as either a skeptical-agnostic or a positive-atheist, but not as a negative-atheist. And why is this so? Because again, if the person is skeptical enough of the “goodness” of the grounds for atheistic belief that he does not believe, to any degree, that God does not exist, then the person is nothing more than a skeptical-agnostic (as per Martin’s own definition), for he holds that there are no good grounds for theistic belief and none for positive atheistic belief either. However, if such a person is skeptical of the “goodness” of the grounds for atheism, but nevertheless believes, to some positive degree, that God does not exist, then such an individual is a positive-atheist, not a negative one. Indeed, perhaps the best term for such a person is an indeterminate-atheist, or an unsure-atheist, given that he is unsure of how good the grounds are for his atheism, but he is still a positive-atheist nonetheless. And so even here, negative-atheism simply does not fit.
And so, the long and short of it is this: using atheist Michael Martin’s own words, we can see that the concept of negative-atheism either collapses into skeptical-agnosticism, or, at best, serves as an inappropriate and inaccurate label for certain positions which could theoretically exist, but which have few, if any, real-life instantiations. Indeed, Martin’s own writings show us that, in reality, negative lack-of-belief atheism is little more than agnosticism in disguise. Consequently, and as has been repeatedly stated, this fact thus further supports the idea that the modern unbeliever’s use of the label ‘negative-atheist’, or ‘lack-of-belief atheist’, is a bullshit maneuver, for while it is rhetorically useful for the unbeliever to use such a term given that it provides him with the burden-avoiding benefits of agnosticism while allowing him to label himself as an “atheist”, it is still a disingenuous maneuver regardless.
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Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam
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